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OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

DDI 3516-82a
27 April 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: [REDACTED]
Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation
Intelligence

SUBJECT: Warning Meeting--Nuclear Proliferation [REDACTED]

The Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation met on 21 April 1982 to discuss warning matters. Attached is my report based on the discussion that took place. Concerning the warning item on Argentina, Harry Rowen and I will be conducting a seminar with analysts later this week to discuss the nuclear-related issues raised by the Falkland Islands dispute.

Attachment:
Warning Report

DDI 3516-82
27 April 1982

Warning Report: Nuclear Proliferation*

Pakistan: It is conceivable that Pakistani-PRC cooperation [redacted]

[redacted] could be broadened to other aspects of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program to include nuclear device fabrication and testing. Any Pakistani reluctance to conduct a nuclear test within its own borders could prompt President Zia to request the use of the PRC test facility at Lop Nor if such an approach hasn't already been tried. Indian knowledge of PRC-Pakistani nuclear cooperation could become an important element in Indian perceptions of the imminence and implications of a Pakistani nuclear weapons capability. It certainly would strengthen the case of those in the Gandhi government arguing for the development of a nuclear weapons capability for India.

Argentina: The Falkland Islands dispute provides the Argentine leadership with an additional incentive to move toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons whatever the outcome. Although they are unlikely to see a direct nuclear threat in the current situation, the Argentine leadership might somehow calculate that the chances for a favorable outcome would have been greater if Argentina possessed a nuclear weapons capability. An Argentine victory in the Falklands, military or diplomatic, might bolster confidence in the security policies of the government including the development of the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. A military setback might cause an acceleration of this effort as the most impressive way to restore prestige and national honor.

*This memorandum is produced periodically by the Special Assistant to the DDI for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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